INTRODUCTION
After World War II, it became clear that'
... without some form of assurance of participation by United States-flag vessels in the transportation of relief and aid cargoes ... the shipping of the recipient and other maritime nations with lower operating costs would be able to underbid American-flag vessels and eventually transport much, if not all, of these cargoes to the irreparable detriment of the American merchant marine. Apart from the old age 4 and nonavailability of certain types of ships,' inability to meet foreign competitors' costs is the major reason why American-flag vessels are unable to compete. REV. 665 (1958) .
a1956 Senate Hearings 131. 'The bulk of American-flag vessels is over ten years old. "Only about x6 per cent of our dry cargo fleet, which numbers 722 ships of 7.3 million deadweight tons, was built after the war." Shipping Outlook, March 1958, p. 4-'Only 12% of vessels equipped for refrigeration fly the American flag. FMB & MAmrniME ADMINIs-RA--roN AwN. RaP. 6o (1957) .
'In 1957, total monthly vessel operating expenses of American-flag ships (not including depreciation) was estimated at $39,758, while Liberian-flag vessels had costs of about $19,325.
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With increasing foreign competition, our ships have carried a declining share of increasing cargo volume. In 1956, all U.S.-flag ships-in both liner and tramp service-carried only 21 per cent of total commercial dry cargo tonnage. This compares with 41 per cent in x95r.7 trade 3 The goal has frequently been interpreted to mean fifty per cent, 14 and since 1948, at least ten foreign aid statutes 1 ' provide for cargo preference in these terms.' When to the 8,oooooo gross tons shipped in i949-54"7 under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,18 Congress added appropriations of $7,000,000,000 for the export of surplus agricultural commodities under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954,19 it can be seen that cargo preference is of vital importance to the entire American shipping industry and is even a matter of life or death to some of its segments.P In spite of these impressive statutory provisions, however, important areas developed to which the requirement did not apply: stockpile materials, 21 offshore procurement, 22 surplus agricultural commodities," guaranties by the United States Government of the convertibility of foreign currency, 24 and the "... . procedures by which a high percentage of exports ... and offshore purchases ... by the United States, have been routed in foreign vessels.. , " To require the application of fifty-fifty requirements to these areas, as well as to make cargo-preference provisions permanent rather than being tied to individual foreign aid bills, 20 Congress enacted the Cargo Prefer- On the other hand, the shipping industry, shipowners, shipbuilders, maritime unions, and the United States Chamber of Commerce unanimously supported the bill.
2 So did the domestic fertilizer industry, which felt that cargo preference would discontinue the previous foreign aid policy of purchasing large quantities of fertilizer from foreign producers.
3
Besides government agencies, the only private organizations opposed to cargo preference were the cotton shippers. They offered lukewarm objections to the imposition of "... arbitrary methods of doing business ... ," but admitted only a slight effect on them 4 II CARGOES SUBJECT TO PREFERENCE The Act applies 5 . . . whenever the United States shall procure, contract for, or otherwise obtain for its own account, or shall furnish to or for the account of any foreign nation without provision for reimbursement, any equipment, materials, or commodities, within or without the United States, or shall advance funds or credits or guarantee the convertibility of foreign currencies in connection with the furnishing of such equipment, materials, or commodities.... raise the American-flag requirements over 5o% in certain circumstances. See discussion of this bill in note 148 infra. 
A. Government Supplies
The Department of Defense, the largest shipper of government supplies, categorizes its supplies into two types for purposes of cargo-preference legislation: Government-owned supplies in its possession or that of a contractor; and supplies, including those for foreign aid, contracted for but not owned by the Government at the time of shipment 3 Supplies of the first type, when for the use of the military departments, are subject to the ioo per-cent American-flag preference, unless American-flag vessels are not available at fair and reasonable rates 111d. § x.3o9(d)(2). Apparently any shipping document indicating tonnage shipped, name, and nationality of vessel satisfies the requirement.
The reporting system seems the same as that discussed in text to note 49 supra, although there are minor differences in wording.
" Whether this rate difference is the same as allowed in similar circumstances by the commodity surplus sales agreements negotiated by the Department of State, discussed in text to note 76 infra, is not clear.
rates for such vessels . ," the contractor, in effect, suffers a loss to the extent the rates are unfair or his costs are raised by the delay. This unfortunate result clearly is not required by the Cargo Preference Act, which, by its terms, does not apply when rates are unfair.
5
The Defense Department regulations provide that "... additional provisions concerning vessels to be used may be inserted in accordance with Departmental procedures."
56 Accordingly, Navy procurement directives permit additional provisions allowing the contracting officer to determine, where possible in large shipments, when and how compliance with the fifty per cent requirement is to be achieved." None. of these Defense Department regulations, however, applies to "... shipments of classified supplies where the classification prohibits the use of nongovernment vessels." .. American aid is furnished "without provisions for reimbursement." This... would embrace .. .aid cargoes which, although technically "sold" by our Government, are, in reality, given away for a purely nominal or token sales price. This reimbursement provision was intended "to exclude from the coverage of the bill instances where this Government acts simply as agent, on a reimbursable basis, for the foreign nation. ' Before the Cargo Preference Act of 1954, there were many instances 4 "See discussion of unfair rates in text to note zx6 infra. The internal report required of the Military Sea Transportation Service by 32 C.F.R. § .3o9(e)(i)(ii) (Supp. 1958) is another example of where the flexibility of the Cargo Preference Act has been ignored. The report includes in: the foreign half shipments made in foreign bottoms when American-flag vessels were physically available, but unreasonably priced, although the Act would not apply in this situation. The result is a requirement of a matchifng American-flag shipment. (Supp. 1958 .. where, for example, fertilizer and other economic-aid commodities are purchased from a European country for delivery to the Far East on a "laid-down cost basis" under which American-flag ships have been effectively "frozen out" because of the lower rates quoted by low-cost foreign competitors.
The Foreign Operations Administration was frequently thought to be the main agency shipping offshore procurement cargoes in foreign bottoms. But the new Act applies whether cargoes are procured ".... within or without the United States ... ," and the current regulations of the International Cooperation Administration, FOA's successor, seem to prohibit the former practice.
Responsibility for enforcement of the applicable fifty-fifty provisions is placed on the co-operating countries by the ICA regulations: if the fifty-fifty requirement is not met, by geographic areas, 66 for any three-month period, 7 the country concerned has to refund ICA reimbursements for commodities, insurance, and freight, "... . as the Director in his discretion shall consider necessary to effect a compliance by the cooperating country with the foregoing requirement for that period of time."
6 Such an enforcement procedure has received congressional disapproval. Cargo-preference requirements of offshore procurement apply, of course, to government supplies as well as to foreign aid.
C. Surplus Agricultural Commodities
Agricultural exports which hit new highs during the Korean conflict fell off rapidly beginning late in 1952. Surpluses built up to alarming proportions. In Congress, emphasis centered on measures to overcome the farm surplus situation and stimulate the exportation of agricultural commodities. These measures involved the sale of price support stocks to commercial firms, donations for relief use, and the inclusion of sales for foreign In the first five years of the program, agreements totaling $5,ooooooooo were signed with foreign countries, including over $400,000,000 for ocean freight to be paid by the Department of Agriculture.' as 2 C.F.R. § 20.6(n) (z958). If the ICA-financed cargo were transported to a country other than the co-operating country for its use there, the regulation is not applicable by its terms. Ibid. Such a situation nearly occurred when surplus grain was sold to Spain for pesetas for resale to Switzerland. " See discussion of geographic areas in text to note x68, infra.
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The statute itself is not strait-jacketed to short time periods. as 22 C.F.R. § 2o.6(n)(s) (958) .
just how a money payment to ICA can' effect compliance for a time period gone past is not made clear. Early in the program, the defeat of an attempted amendment to the original bill to provide for change of tide in certain transactions at destination rather than port of origin 72 was interpreted by the Department of Agriculture as meaning ".... the House had not intended that the 50-50 legislation should apply to section i of Public Law 48o. '' 73 But the Attorney General ruled 74 that the surplus sales", of publiclyand privately-owned stocks under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act amounted to a "guarantee of convertibility of foreign currencies" within the meaning of the Cargo Preference Act, although there was neither a "guarantee" nor a "conversion" in the strictest meaning of the words.
The Department of State, which negotiates surplus agricultural commodity agreements with foreign countries, 76 has said the Cargo Preference Act has hampered the surplus disposal program in only a few countries. 7 7 On the other hand, the Department of Agriculture says the fifty-fifty provision has added at least $I2,000,000 to the cost of the farm program, including $3,oooooo for rate differentials. Id. at 17. These nations refuse to negotiate title I agreements avowedly because of the 5o-5o provision, which, the Department of Agriculture estimates, has cut export agreements by up to Soo,oooooo worth of farm products. Id. at 75.
"If the country has a weak currency and no merchant fleet of any size, transportation, whether in American or foreign bottoms, is paid in dollars by the United States. The importing country reimburses in its currency, but only up to the cost of foreign-flag vessels. The difference is the "rate Transportation on importing country-flag vessels is not financed by the United States. 7 C.F.R. § sxl.z(c) (Supp. 1958 
(1957).
Of the Surplus Agricultural Commodity Agreements cited in note 76 supra, those with Spain and to exempt transactions under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act from cargo-preference requirements was made in 1956;19 hearings were held by the Senate Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee,"° but the bill was never reported out.
Seemingly, the few ways to avoid the Cargo Preference Act in transactions under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act require considerable effort. One method, administrative determination of exemption from cargo-preference requirements, such as the 1956 sale of surplus tobacco to England in return for new housing at American military bases there,"' is apparently available only in extraordinary cases. In limited situations where no American-flag vessels will be available-e.g., nonavailability of refrigerator ships to carry fresh meat to Scandinaviathe Department of Agriculture has indicated it will be willing to make a separate commodity transaction instead of a package deal, but not unless it is absolutely certain American bottoms will be unavailable 8 Finally, a "switch" transaction, where a third country furnishes dollars for the purchasing country, may avoid the Cargo Preference Act.
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The experience of the Pacific coast apple industry illustrates the administrative rigidity that has characterized the application of the basically flexible statute. Required refrigerator tonnage off the west coast for sales to Europe was virtually nonexistent, even though there was "reefer" tonnage available on the east coast 8 4 Despite these difficulties, the importance of time, and the fact that the Government suffers no loss in these sales, the Department of Agriculture persisted in applying the Cargo Preference Act on a commodity-by-commodity basis, 5 although neither the statute nor the regulations require it. Furthermore, the apple sellers could not rely on the possibility of commodity waivers, as that ". ..would be offset in shipments of some other commodity.
[They] would be tied to whatever complications and delays the latter might encounter in negotiations between governments." The DecemberChristmas 1954 trade in Britain was lost that way, even though there was never any question that the waiver was in order!' The same situation held true for fruit generally. 7 In 1956, surplus sales of fresh fruits and fruit products were exempted from cargo-preference requirements 8 The Senate report noted the possibility of a similar problem in animal products, but left any action to the executive branch!'
Contrasting with the strictness with which the Cargo Preference Act was applied to the fruit industry prior to their 1956 exemption is the Opinion of the General Counsel, Department of Agriculture, that sales of nonfat dry milk by the Department to foreign governments and agencies of the United Nations for welfare distribution to refugees in Palestine and Israel were not subject to the fifty-fifty provision. 9 " The Government paid one to two cents per pound to put the milk alongside the transporting vessel in United States ports, where "title and possession" changed to the purchaser, who paid three to four cents per pound in dollars for the milk for restricted use, which was less than the cost of unrestricted milk. This, said the General Counsel, was "reimbursement," making the Cargo Preference Act inapplicable.
Regardless of the merits of cargo preference, it must be admitted this opinion departs from the tendency, even among its foes, to apply the Act where a cargo is "touched anywhere along the line by the hand of government." 91 Where it stresses governmental benefit in disposing of products at the highest price obtainable, the opinion ignores the command of the statute that it applies "... whenever the United States shall ... advance funds . . . in connection with the furnishing of . . ." any commodities within or without the United States. Furthermore, the opinion does not accord with the intent of the Attorney General's opinion regarding sales under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, 3 where a seemingly more difficult argument was easily hurdled. Finally, it ignores legislative history that the reimbursement exception to the Act's coverage was intended to take care of situations where the Government only acted as "agent," rather than selling the product itself? 4 To the same effect, however, is the announcement of the Department of Agriculture that the Cargo Preference Act is not applicable when it extends credit to American exporters, whether they purchase commodities from the Department or not, or whether the exporter's or the importer's line of credit obtains the bank obligation Such waivers may be obtained ... for up to the full amount of an export if U.S. vessels are not available and, where U.S. vessels are available, for up to one-half of the export provided such portion is carried on vessels of the importing country.
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Besides its own banking operations, the Export-Import Bank conducts special lending operations for other agencies. It lends for the Office of Defense Mobilization under the Defense Production Act of i95o,1°1 and it performs several functions for the ICA: credits under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, emergency wheat loans, the $ioooooooo credit to the European Steel and Coal Community under the Mutual Security Act of I95i, and ICA investment guaranties (currency transfer and loss by war or confiscation).1'
As noted above,' 0 3 the last is not covered by cargo preference, 10 4 nor is the Bank's insuring of consigned cotton bales against war risks and expropriation. 0 5 However, the ICA regulations 0 8 apparently subject the remaining operations to cargo preference. 
" U.S. DEP'T oF AGRICULTURE, EXPORT CREDIT PROGRAMS FOR FINANCING DOLLAR SALES OF U.S.

AGIuCULTURAL COMMaODITIES (1957
MENT GUARANTY HANDBOOK (1957). " EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF WASHINGTON, REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE PERIOD JULY-DECEMBER 1956, at 5 (1957).
In June 1958, the Bank began to make loans in foreign currencies accumulating under the surplus-disposal program to American firms for foreign expansion and development and to foreign firms to expand markets abroad for American agricultural products. In the following year, the Bank acted on a foreign currency equivalent of $36,ooo,ooo. E. Miscellaneous Even though there seems to be no regulation or policy statement on the subject, returns of Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 equipment, for example from the United Kingdom,' would be subject to cargo preference, 0 8 since the United Kingdom makes delivery alongside the ship at the port of origin. Similarly, transportation to Italy of surplus Defense Department property for sale there 0 would be subject to the same requirement. The opposite result should obtain when transportation follows purchase, absent stipulations in the contract of sale." 0 Student exchange programs for which the Government provides funds, including transportation,"' would seem to be not subject to cargo preference. The discretion to waive can be exercised immediately whenever the national interest so requires."" ' 5 Other agencies may secure the waiver, but it is not known whether this authority has ever been exercised.
III DTERINATION OF NONAVAILABILITY oF AMERICAN-FLAG VESSIMS
The Cargo Preference Act only applies ".... to the extent United States-flag commercial vessels are available at fair and reasonable rates for [such] This formula was introduced to avoid setting ceilings on rates" 1 or allowing American shipowners a free .hand in rate-setting. But the phrase has been the statute's most troublesome to apply.""
A. Responsibility for the Determination
The Secretary of Commerce pointed out during committee hearings that" 9 ... the bill is not clear as to who is to determine, for purposes of the 50 per cent minimum participation provision, whether United States-flag commercial vessels are available and whether their rates are reasonable.
This uncertainty and a lack of coordination among agencies seeking ships has resulted in at least one debacle. In early 1955, the FOA and the Department of Agriculture were both conducting huge programs for the sale of surplus grain to Yugoslavia. Freight rates on American vessels paid by the Department of Agriculture in February 1955 were up ninety-seven per cent over rates obtainable the previous October. Meanwhile the Maritime Administration, operating without data on these programs, permitted the transfer of nearly one-half the total American-flag tramp fleet, then consisting of about 13o Liberty dry-cargo vessels, to foreign flags, thus intensifying the bottleneck. 125 while the Maritime Administration should exercise general surveillance and make periodic reports to Congress covering operation of the Cargo Preference Act."' Thus the stage is set for a maze of different methods of determining whether an American-flag vessel is available at a fair and reasonable rate.
B. Methods of Determination
The difficulty of determining fair and reasonable rates for American-flag commercial vessels is shown by comparing the testimony of administrators who have made their ".... own computations on the basis of cost of operation and then checked them with the Maritime Administration to determine whether or not the rates were reasonable ... with that of the administrator who said his agency had made no ".... determination or ... finding as to what are fair and reasonable rates because, frankly, I don't know what a fair and reasonable rate is.' 28 Statement of Mr. Arthur G. Syran, Director, Office of Transportation, FOA, z955 Admin. Hearings 46. The following testimony of Mr. Syran is also instructive: "This American tramp operator should be supported and I would be unwilling to go into the foreign-flag market, say, exclusively to get vessels. . . . We haven't done that. If the vessel isn't available, that may only be a matter of a week or io days .... We would go out of our way to use an American tramp .... There should be competition between the American-flag operators, but he should be given the preference not only from the point of view of the statute, but as a moral obligation. . . . I don't think it is right for us to announce that we are going to use foreign-flag operators because if an American-flag operator is making a profit there is a bonanza for the foreigner .... This is a fantastic price of $1'.75 as compared to $7.50-' Id. at 55. Figures referred to are shown in note i2o supra.
The formula was adopted on the Senate floor, where a "market" rate provision was deleted in favor of the "fair and reasonable" rate, as it was thought by Senator Butler, the bill's sponsor, and others that the latter formula would be less costly to the taxpayers. 29 However, two different interpretations of "fair and reasonable" were adopted by the agencies :130
One view is that a rate may be considered unfair and unreasonable when it exceeds the going market rate. The other view is that a fair and reasonable rate is one which will return to the United States-flag operator a fair profit in addition to his operating costs.
A position similar to the latter interpretation was taken by the Comptroller General, who, supported by the Senate floor debates, declared that "fair and reasonable rates"
should not mean1 3 '
... going market rates as such for the United States-flag commercial vessels.... However, it seems apparent that the statute contemplates average "fair and reasonable rates," which may or may not be profitable, or even compensatory, to a high-cost operator.
The current regulations of the agencies responsible for government programs involving ocean freight subject to the Cargo Preference Act indicate this dichotomy has been all but ignored.'
To be sure, the GSA has made computations based on cost of operation, but the recent GSA Administrative Order prescribing agency application of the Cargo Preference Act defines fair and reasonable rates as generally the rates established by operators of dry-cargo liners.'
In 1951, the Maritime Administration, too, made determinations of ".... a fair and reasonable maximum level for privately owned vessels . ,""' and its current uniform bareboat charters of Government-owned dry-cargo vessels indicate familiarity with similar computations. 3 5 Nevertheless, there is recent indication that fair and reasonable profits are prominently emphasized in rate calculations of the Maritime Administration. 3 6 On the other hand, the Department of Agriculture has never endeavored to consider cost and profit data in making rate determinations, nor has it established Zoo CoG. REC. 7784, 7796, 7808 (1954) a See definitions of "net voyage profit," "fair and reasonable overhead expenses," and "capital necessarily employed" in clause 38 of the uinform bareboat charter, 46 C.F.R. § 221.13 (Supp. 1958 a "fair and reasonable" rate. 3 7 Instead, information on vessel availability is collected from brokers and foreign embassies, and the Maritime Administration (National Shipping Authority) ceiling is taken as the-upper limit of what is fair and reasonable. 8 The current regulations are silent on the point, but reimbursement for ocean transportation of surplus commodity export sales (when procured separately from the commodity) is limited to the prevailing rate for similar freight contracts, or in the.case of dry-cargo liner shipments, to the conference rate for such service 18 -The FOA-admitted in 1956 not knowing what a "fair and reasonable" rate was; and so it took vessels at market rate, as long as not "unconscionable. 140 The current regulation may indicate a separate formula: ".... fair and reasonable rates for such a vessel."'' Arguably, this may require cost recovery and reasonable profit determination for each vessel, whether a high-or low-cost operation. Probably, however, the term is merely the singular of "such vessels" as used in the statute, which, in view of the FOA opinion that a vessel's books could not be gone into, 142 presumably means "market" rates to this agency also.
In exempting carriage of government or contractor goods from the too per cent American-flag requirement, the Defense Department formula is: ". . . unless such vessels are not available at fair and reasonable United States-flag rates.'1 4 This implies the fair and reasonable rates need not be commercial rates, and thus allows imposition of the National Shipping Authority government-operated rates as" a ceiling,1 44 if this be desired.
Except possibly for the formula of the Department of Defense, it appears that the federal agencies administering the Cargo Preference Act, despite Comptroller General and House Committee urging, are unwilling and generally unable to base rate determinations on "cost plus reasonable profit" concepts. Rather, the current regulations strongly imply almost complete dependence on market determinations, save only for a helping hand from the Maritime Administration when market rates lose all semblance of fairness and reasonableness. Thus, the current Maritime Ad- .. See note 138 supra. The contract clause required by 32 C.F.R. § 5.309(d)(a)(ii) (Supp. 5958), discussed in text to note 52 supra, employs the commercial-rates test. Note also in that clause the American-flag vessels must be available for timely shipment; otherwise the American-flag requirement is waived. This is the only agency statement adding a timeliness requirement. ministration rate determinations 14 5 are vital in programs subject to the Cargo Preference Act.
C. Methods of Choosing Foreign-Flag Vessels
Indications of method of choice of foreign-flag vessels are apparently available only from the ICA. There, emphasis is placed on use of ships of foreign aid recipients, as distinguished from the vessels sailing under "flags of convenience," on the ground that the latter make no genuine contribution to the economy of the country under whose flag they fly. 47 When vessels of the country receiving aid are (1958) . ' The foreign nation basically administers the 50-50 requirement under programs of the Department of Agriculture, z955 Admin. Hearings 33; and the ICA. 22 C.F.R. § 2or.6(n)(I) (1958) . See text to note 68 supra.
The ICA has added the unique requirement that cargo-preference compliance is required for each fiscal quarter. 22 C.F.R. § 2oi.6(n) (I) (1958) (Supp. V, 1958) .
A. Vessel Classification
The first classification to which the fifty-fifty provision applies is specified in the statute: vessel type. "Tramp ships [,] ...the dry-bulk carriers described in the [Act] ... ,"4 are slow, irregularly-scheduled vessels which go where a prospective cargo calls. The American tramp fleet contains about seventy vessels and carries about two per cent of our commercial dry-cargo exports."" Dry-cargo liners operate a "... . regularly scheduled service on fixed routes under which rates are published and identical regardless of nationality of ship."' 5 6 They constitute about ninety per cent of our freighter fleet," 3 7 and are generally faster than tramps."' Each class may carry cargoes of the other, and the resulting difficulty of definition is reflected in the regulations. The Department of Agriculture has adopted " ' the Maritime Administration's definitions, 6 0 distinguishing tramps from liners principally by regularity of schedule; the GSA, on the other hand, differentiates by method of rate determination;' 6 Several United States treaties provide: "vessels of either Party shall be accorded national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment with respect to the right to carry all cargo that may be carried by vessel to or from the territories of the other Party." In treaties taking effect (a) prior to "8o and (b) subsequent to' 8 ' enactment of the Cargo Preference Act, the effect of this clause on the Act's administration raises a difficult problem: Are the government agencies administering the Act required to treat German-flag vessels, for example, as American-flag vessels by virtue of the national-treatment provision1 82 in the German treaty? Furthermore, must Israeliflag vessels be treated as are these German-flag vessels, by virtue of the most-favorednation provision" s a in the Israeli treaty? No conclusive answer is available; certainly the congressional committees were not advised of the problem in the cargo-preference hearings.
When the Cargo Preference Act was passed in 1954, its operation was not affected by the presence of this clause in existing treaties.'8 4 Thus, unless the German .. "treatment accorded within the territories of a Party upon terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein, in like situations, to nationals, companies, products, vessels or other objects, as the case may be, of such Party." Treaty with Germany, supra art. XXV.
s -C. . . treatment accorded within the territories of a Party upon terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein, in like situations, to nationals, companies, products, vessels or other objects, as the case may be, of any third country." Ibid. 185-95 (1943) . 'Enactment of the Cargo Preference Act probably is no treaty applies to cargoes subject to the cargo-preference laws, no difficulty arises. Several possible reasons may be suggested why the German treaty is inapplicable.
First, the treaty itself provides it ". . . shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures ...necessary to protect its essential security interests."' 8 5 The Cargo Preference Act is premised on 86 ...the policy of assuring to privately owned United States merchant-flag vessels that "substantial portion of the waterborne export and import foreign commerce," which the Congress has proclaimed in repeated statutes as necessary to maintenance of an adequate merchant fleet. This necessity is based to an important degree on the role of the American merchant marine as ". . . an indispensable factor in our whole defense system.' 87 To the extent this is so, the Cargo Preference Act would seem a measure excepted by the treaty as a United States step ". . . necessary to protect its essential security interests."
In the second place, the Senate committee report on the German treaty pointed out that the national and most-favored-nation treatment provisions applied to "... normal commercial and industrial pursuits. ' In a sense, foreign aid and government cargoes are neither normal nor commercial. This conclusion finds support in the analogous treaty provision giving only most-favored-nation, not national, treatment with respect to awarding of government contracts.
The workings of the Cargo Preference Act and related legislation are difficult to attack solely on the basis of a free-trade doctrine. Furthermore, there is no impressive evidence these laws significantly restrict foreign trade. On the other hand, administrative application of the fifty-fifty laws leaves much to be desired toward realizing the benefits of both cargo preference and the programs to which it applies. Since cargo preference increasingly seems a permanent fixture of our maritime scene, it is to be hoped that better methods of coping with it will be devised by the government agencies concerned.
